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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

PARK CITY,

;

Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

]
I
]

SAM LEVY,

;

Defendant/Appellant.

Appeal No. 20000610-CA

]

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from Defendant's conviction of driving while under the influence
of alcohol in violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44(2)(1953 as amended), in the Third
Judicial District Court, Division II, Park City Department, State of Utah, the Honorable
Judge Pat Brian, presiding. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah Code Ann. §78-2a3 (1953 as amended).

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
There are two issues presented in this appeal.
1.

Did the trial court fail to comply with Rule 18, Utah Rules of Criminal

Procedure, selection of a jury and Rule 4-404, Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, jury
selection, by obtaining law enforcement personnel and court clerks from the Summit
County Courthouse building as prospective jurors rather than summoning jurors from a
qualified list? Regarding this issue, the standard is whether the trial court substantially
failed to comply with Rule 4-404, Utah Rules of Administrative Procedure, and Rule 18,
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and whether substantial injustice and prejudice
resulted. State v. Suarez, 793 P.2d 934, 937 (Utah App. 1990).
2.

Did the trial court misinterpret Utah law and incorrectly bar evidence on the

absorptive and metabolic rate of alcohol under Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44(2)(a)(i) (Supp.
1999)? Regarding this issue the standard is,"[w]hether a statute imposes a presumption is
a question of statutory interpretation and, therefore, a question of law reviewed for
correctness." State v. Preece, 971 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah App. 1998).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are compiled in an
appendix where not set forth in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant, Samuel A. Levy, was charged with driving under the influence of
alcohol in violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44(2)(a). Defendant pled not guilty and a
jury trial was set.
2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

Park City alleged that Defendant, Samuel A. Levy ("Mr. Levy") committed

the offense of driving while under the influence of alcohol in Park City on the evening of
February 6, 1999. (Transcript p.4 lines 17-22).
2.

The prosecution offered Scott Buchanan ("Buchanan"),fromthe Park City

Police Department, as the city's witness. (Transcript p.5 lines 6-7).
3.

Mr. Levy, his wife, Dana Levy ("Mrs. Levy") and Denny Crouch

("Crouch") were offered as witnesses by the Defense. (Transcript p.5 lines 16-18).
4.

After the 11 prospective jurors were sworn in and the court had finished

with preliminary jury qualification questions the jury panel proceeded to voir dire
examination. (Transcript p.3-4; p.6 lines 8-25 through p.7 lines 1-10).
5.

The court then asked the prospective jurors: "Are any of you acquainted

with any law enforcement officer? That is, you personally knowing someone who is in
the Park City Police Department, the Summit County Sheriffs Office, the Utah Highway
Patrol, the FBI, the DEA, the CIA, anybody who is in law enforcement[?]" (Transcript
p.20 lines 21-25 through p.21 lines 1-2).
6.

Juror 11 was excused for cause after conceding that discussions with her

ex-husband, a former employee of the Los Angeles Police Department, would impugn
her impartiality in this trial. (Transcript p.23 lines 14-25 through p.24 lines 1-22).
7.

Juror 9 was excused for his experience with a past D.U.I (Transcript p. 28

lines 8-25 through p.29 lines 1-15).
8.

The court admonished the prospective jurors about the Constitutionally
3

time-honored principle that the defendant's presumption of innocence remains until the
defendant's guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The court then asked if anyone
did not understand or agree with this fundamental presumption. Juror 3 and Juror 7
participated in separate side-bar conferences and Juror 3 was excused for cause.
(Transcript p.33 lines 1-25 through p.34 lines 1-25).
9.

The court asked whether any of the prospective jurors would be swayed by

a police officer s testimony simply by virtue of the witness's position as a law
enforcement officer and implored that the jury impartially "apply the same yardstick" to
measure the credibility of all of the witnesses. (Transcript p.34 lines 16-25, p.3 5 lines 125 through p.36 lines 1-24).
10.

At this point in the jury selection process only eight prospective jurors

remained and if both counsel had exercised their three peremptory challenges then the
jury pool would have been reduced to an inadequate number. The prosecutor suggested
that the Defendant waive some the Defense's peremptory challenges. The Defendant
refused. As well, the prosecution would not waive two preemptory challenges so that the
existing panel could be utilized. (Transcript p.79 lines 15-25 through p.80 lines 1-10).
11.

The court instructed the bailiff to find more prospective jurors: "You can go

to the clerk's office, go to the sheriffs office, go over to the industrial building and you
bring me four more jurors post haste." (Transcript p.37 lines 11-15).
12.

The bailiff went through the courthouse only and returned with four

prospective jurors, all of whom worked in the Summit County Courthouse building:
Jurors 12 and 13, Summit County Justice Court Clerks; Juror 14, a Summit County
4

Dispatcher; and, Juror 15, a Summit County Deputy Sheriff. (Transcript p.39 line 16;
p.41 line 12; p.42 lines 5-7; p.42 lines 5-6, 18-23).
13.

Except for Juror 14, the county dispatcher, all of the prospective jurors had

prior working relationships with prosecutor Christiansen and defense counsel D'Elia. In
addition, Juror 13's father was a Summit County Sheriffs Sergeant and Juror 15 was a
veteran Summit County Sheriff with 23 years under his belt. (Transcript p.43 lines 11-25;
p.44 lines 1-22; p.47 lines 8-9; p.58 lines 21-24).
14.

The court noted for the record that all of the prospective jurors shared "a

livelihood in law enforcement." After questioning the group collectively as to their
impartiality as jurors the court passed them on to counsel for any reasonable questions.
(Transcript p.50 lines 21-25; p.51 lines 2-9, 25; p.52 lines 1-3).
15.

It was established through voir dire that Juror 15, Deputy Sheriff Judd, had

dealt with the arresting officer and prosecution witness, Buchanan, in a professional
setting and had formed an opinion as to his credibility. Deputy Sheriff Judd was
dismissed for cause. (Transcript p.62 lines 9-16; p. 63 lines 11-14).
16.

The prosecution passed the jury for cause. The Defense took exception to

the three prospective jurors pulled from the Summit County Courthouse building and
Juror 7 who had previously expressed reservations concerning a defendant's
Constitutionally guaranteed presumption of innocence. (Transcript p.74 lines 4-13; p.94
lines 5-17).
17.

Regarding the three Summit County employees, the Defendant argued that

while it may be appropriate to choose prospective jurors from a qualified jury list or bring
5

them in off of the street, it is not appropriate to select jurors solely from the Justice Court
Center and the Sheriffs Department. The Defense explained that, inter alia, the close
working relationships in the Summit County building would cause the jurors to be partial
to the prosecution's testimony. (Transcript p.80 lines 11-16; p.87 lines 5-15; p.88 lines 513).
18.

The Defendant contended that under the United States Constitution and the

Utah Constitution, in the interests of fairness and due process rights, the two court clerks
and the dispatcher —Jurors 12, 13, and 14— should be excused for cause, correctly
reserving the Defense's peremptory challenges for the properly selected jurors.
(Transcript p.89 lines 3-25 through p.90 line 1; p. 87 lines 21-24).
19.

After noting the Defense's objections to Jurors 7, 12, 13, and 14 the court

asked the prosecution and the Defense to exercise their peremptory challenges. The jury
ultimately was comprised of the three replacement jurors selected from the Summit
County Justice Center and one original juror from the qualified jury list. (Transcript p.95
lines 23-25; p.100 lines 24-25 through p.101 lines 1-11).
20.

As the trial proceeded a legal issue arose as to the admissibility of the

Defense's witness, a forensic toxicologist, Denny Crouch, and his testimony as to the
Defendant's blood alcohol concentration at the time of arrest. (Transcript p.105 lines 2125 through p. 106 1-25).
21.

The Defendant argued that under the prosecution's interpretation of Utah

Criminal Code §41-6-44 (2)(a)(i), the statute's wording creates a conclusive presumption
that can not be attacked on any grounds and is therefore unconstitutional. (Transcript p.
6

112 lines 20-25, p.l 13 lines 1-25 through p.l 14 lines 1-7).
22.

The court declared "that the statute clearly says that the question's not what

the breathalyzer test was at the time of the stop, but what a breathalyzer test was within
two hours of the stop." (Transcript p. 119 lines 2-6).
23.

The Defense proffered for the record that their expert witness would have

testified that Mr. Levy had a blood alcohol concentration of less than .08 at the time of
his arrest, based on his physical characteristics, and on the type and amount of alcohol
consumed. (Transcript p. 120 lines 23-25 through p. 121 lines 1-13).
24.

The court sustained the prosecution's objection and barred any expert

testimony relevant to the Defendant's blood alcohol concentration at the time of the stop.
(Transcript p. 127 lines 1-25).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Under the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration Rule 4-404( 10), calling

additional jurors, the trial court is mandated to exhaust all reasonable efforts to summon
additional jury membersfroma qualified jury list before resorting to extraordinary
means, in order to ensure uniformity and administrative accountability of jury selection.
2.

The amended version of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 (2)(a)(i) (1999), driving

under the influence of alcohol, as interpreted by the trial court is unconstitutional because
it invokes a conclusive presumption.
Defendant argued that he could not be found guilty for two reasons.
1.

The Utah Legislature's intent is clear and unambiguous in Rule 4-404 and

the mandatory jury selection procedure is obviousfromthe language used in the statute's
7

construction. As a matter of policy the trial court's rogue jury selection procedure
undermined the intent of the legislature to ensure uniformity and administrative
responsibility in the jury selection process. It was a substantial departure from proper jury
selection for the trial court to immediately deviate from the qualified jury list and select
additional jurors exclusively from the Justice Court office and Sheriffs office.
2.

Under Utah law a statute that triggers an irrebuttable presumption is

unconstitutional. The Defendant has a right to attack a presumption on any grounds. The
trial court's interpretation of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 (2)(a)(i) was incorrect and the
Defendant had a right to introduce evidence on the absorptive and metabolic rates of
alcohol to prove his innocence.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLY WITH
UTAH RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 4-404 (10) AND RULE 18 UTAH
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CAUSED SUBSTANTIAL INJUSTICE AND
PREJUDICE TO MR. LEVY.
The trial court failed to substantially comply with Utah law by calling additional
jurors exclusively from the Summit County Justice Center instead of from a qualified
jury list and caused substantial injustice and prejudice to Defendant, Mr. Levy.
(Transcript at 84).
Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-404 (1992), jury selection and
service, states as part of its Intent: "To establish a uniform procedure for jury selection,
qualification, atnd service [and] [t]o establish administrative responsibility for jury

8

selection." The procedure for calling additional jurors states:
If there is an insufficient number of prospective jurors to fill all jury
panels, the court shall direct the clerk of the court to summon from the
qualified jury list such additional jurors as necessary. The clerk shall make
every reasonable effort to contact the prospective jurors in the order
listed on the qualified jury list.
Utah Rules of Judicial Administration 4-404( 10) (1992) [emphasis].
Only after the trial court has exhausted all reasonable efforts at contacting jurors from the
qualified jury list, "the court may use any lawful method for acquiring a jury." Id.
[emphasis].
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 18 (e)(4) (1999) states that a challenge for
cause may be taken against a juror for "[t]he existence of any ... relationship
between the prospective juror and any party ... which relationship when viewed
objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that the prospective juror would be
unable or unwilling to return a verdict which would be free of favoritism." [emphasis].
"The ordinary meaning of language should always be favored. The form of the
verb used in a statute, i.e., something "may," "shall" or "must" be done, is the single most
important textual consideration determining whether a statute is mandatory or directory."
Sutherland Statutory Construction §57.03, at 7 (5th ed. 1992). Accord State in Interest of
M.C. 940 P.2d 1229, 1236 (Utah App. 1997). In State in Interest of M.C. the Utah Court
of Appeals concluded, "'[t]he term 'may,' means permissive,... 'shall,' on the other
hand, 'is usually presumed mandatory and has been interpreted as such previously in this
and other jurisdictions.'" 940 P.2d at 1236 (quoting Board of Educ. v. Salt Lake County,
659 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah 1983); see also Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818, 820 (Utah
9

App. 1992)).
In State v. Suarez, 793 P.2d 934, 937 (Utah App. 1990), the defendant challenged
the trial court's use of jurors excused on the same day, by a different judge, to fill an
unanticipated shortage of trial jurors. The Appellate Court interpreted Utah Code Ann.
§78-46-13(4) (1987) (which was repealed in 1992 and replaced by Rule 4-404(10) of the
Utah Rules of Judicial Administration). The former statute stated, "[i]f there is an
unanticipated shortage of available trial jurors drawn from a qualified jury wheel, the
court may require the clerk of the court to summon a sufficient number of trial jurors
[from the qualified jury list]." Suarez, 793 P.2d at 937 [emphasis original]. The Appellate
Court stressed that the statute in Suarez was "couched in permissive terms and appear[ed]
to give the court some discretion on how to make up a shortage of jurors." Id.
Specifically the Appellate Court pointed out that the statute merely directs that the court
may draw jurors from the jury wheel but does not require it to do so. The Suarez court
held that "[t]he decision to utilize qualified, unused jurors who had been properly called
to serve as jurors on that day . . . " was permissible and was not a substantial departure
from proper jury selection. Id at 938.
In the case at bar the trial court's use of jurors from the Summit County Justice
Center, instead of jurors selected from a qualified jury list, constitutes a substantial
departure from proper jury selection and less than a lawful method of acquiring a jury. In
Suarez the jury selection statute afforded the trial court discretion by stating that in the
event that jurors can not be selected from a qualified jury list then the court may require
the clerk to draw more jurors from a qualified jury wheel. Here, the current statute, Rule
10

4-404(10), orders the trial court that it shall draw additional jurors from a qualified jury
list and shall exhaust all reasonable efforts to call additional jurors from a qualified jury
list before resorting to extraordinary means. In this case there is nothing on the record to
show that the clerk of the court made any attempt to exhaust efforts to use jurors from the
qualified list before resorting to the most irregular method of pulling potential jurors from
the court office and the Sheriffs office. (Transcript at 37). The language of the jury
selection statute is clear and unambiguous and the legislature's intent is obvious from the
language used that the Utah Legislature wanted to ensure "uniformity" and
"administrative responsibility" for the jury selection process. As a matter of policy the
trial court should be held to the procedure mandated in Rule 4-404 in order to ensure Due
Process.
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 18, selection ofjury, stresses that it is
proper to challenge a juror for cause when that prospective juror's relationship to persons
involved in a trial would suggest favoritism. In the case at bar the jury panel was
manipulated by the court so that of the additional panel members, all were Summit
County employees from the same building that houses the trial court. In addition to one
police officer, two were Summit County Justice Court clerks and one was a Summit
County dispatcher, and all of them had close working relationships with law enforcement
officials. (Transcript at 41-44). The trial court admitted for the record that, "the
prospective jurors have a livelihood in law enforcement, working either as a clerk in the
Justice of the Peace court or working as a dispatcher,... or working as a law
enforcement officer." (Transcript at 50-51). Reasonable minds would conclude that jurors
11

enmeshed in the small law enforcement community in Summit County would be unable
to make a decision^ee of favoritism. The propensity for bias clearly outweighs the trial
court's necessity to resort to these additional jurors. A jury panel injected with a police
officer, police dispatcher and Justice Court employees, who were selected by the court
entirely from the close-knit Summit County law enforcement community, is a gross
departure from Due Process.
In State v. Baker, 935 P.2d 503 (1997) the Utah Supreme Court adopted the cureor-waive rule holding that the defense must exercise a peremptory challenge if one exists
against the juror unsuccessfully challenged for cause in order to preserve the error on
appeal. The cure-or-waive rule should not preclude this appeal because the trial court
substantially departed from congressionally mandated jury selection procedures and
vitiated their legislative intent. Justice Zimmerman's prescient dissent in Baker was
written with this case in mind. In response to the Utah Supreme Court's adoption of the
cure-or-waive rule and its possible negative consequences, Justice Zimmerman implored:
We would be loath to create a mechanism that could be seen
as giving trial judges the ability to force defendants to use all their
peremptories to cure trial court refusals to strike biased jurors.
This is completely inconsistent with the fact that empanelling impartial
jurors is primarily the responsibility of the trial judge.
Baker, 935 P.2d at 511.
ARGUMENT
POINT TWO
UTAH CODE ANN. §41-6-44 (2)(a)(i) CREATES AN IRREBUTTABLE
PRESUMPTION AND IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER UTAH LAW.

12

The Utah Code Ann. §41 -6-44 (2)(a)(i) (1999) was interpreted by the trial court to
disallow any expert testimony based on the Defendant's rate of alcohol absorption or
metabolism used to establish the Defendant's actual blood alcohol concentration at the
time of arrest. The trial court's interpretation of the unconstitutional wording of the
D.U.I, statute invokes an irrebuttable presumption and violates Utah law. (Transcript at
120).
The Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 (2)(a)(i) (1999) states:
(2)
A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle
within this state if the person:
(i)
has sufficient alcohol in his body that a chemical test given within
two hours of the alleged operation or physical control shows that the
person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or
greater;
The former statute stated:
(i)
has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or
greater as shown by a chemical test given within two hours after the
alleged operation or physical control;
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 (2)(a)(i)(Supp. 1998).
In State v. Preece, 971 P.2d 1,6 (Utah App. 1998) the Appellate Court held "that
the trial court erred in sustaining the State's objection to evidence on the absorptive and
metabolic rates of alcohol." The Appellate Court reversed the defendant's conviction for
driving with a blood/breath alcohol level above the statutory limit of .08 because,"[by]
erroneously invoking a conclusive presumption, the trial court denied Preece the ability
to challenge the [intoxilyzer] test's accuracy on the ground that he absorbed alcohol after
he stopped driving." Id. at 7. The Appellate Court cited City of Orem v. Crandall, 760
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P.2d 920, 923-924 (Utah App. 1988), to support its conclusion that Utah Code Ann. §416-44(2) "was constitutional precisely because it carried no presumption ... and
[therefore] the defendant is allowed to challenge the accuracy of the test on any relevant
ground." Id. at 6 [internal brackets removed].
The case at bar and Preece share very similar fact patterns in that both defendants
were stopped for lane violations, both had consumed alcohol only a short time before the
stop, and both were later cited for driving under the influence of alcohol. (Transcript at
103). Essentially the only difference is that here the Defendant, Mr. Levy, is being tried
under the amended statute, Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 (2)(a)(i) (1999). The prosecution
argued that the forensic toxicologist's testimony pertaining to Mr. Levy's absorptive and
metabolic rates of alcohol was irrelevant by virtue of the conclusive statutory
presumption set forth in §41-6-44 (2)(a)(i). (Transcript at 106). This is the same argument
that was struck down in Preece where the Appellate Court stressed that the statute was
only able to withstand constitutional scrutiny "precisely because it carried no
presumption." Preece, 971 P.2d at 6. The trial court in this case misinterpreted Utah Code
Ann. §41-6-44 (2)(a)(i) and incorrectly barred Defendant's expert testimony challenging
the accuracy of the intoxilyzer results.
CONCLUSION
The Defendant, Mr. Levy, should have his D.U.I, conviction reversed.
The Defendant was prejudiced by the trial court's substantial departure from
proper jury selection. The trial court did not adhere to the Utah Legislature's clear and
unambiguous rules mandating jury selection procedures.
14

Utah Code Ann. §41 -6-44 (2)(a)(i) as interpreted and applied by the trial court is
unconstitutional because it carries a conclusive presumption.
Dated this £\ day of

<

S*P~^"

_, 2000.
D'ELIA & LEHMER

GenAp'Elia
Attorney for Appellant
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This matter came before the Court on the 11* day of August, 1999, the Honorable Judge Pat
B. Brian presiding, Summit County Attorney Terry Christiansen was present representing the State
of Utah, and the Defendant appeared in person and was represented by Gerry D'Elia.
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IT IS ADJUDGED that the Defendant is guilty as charged and convicted.
IT IS ADJUDGED that the Defendant pays a fine in the amount of $1,500.00 on or before
August 13,1999.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ADDENDUM TO
APPELLANT'S BRIEF was served via first class mail postage prepaid to the following:
Park City Prosecutor
Tom Daley
P.O. Box 1480
Park City, Utah 84060
DATED this 28™ day of September, 2000.
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